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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000500250002-2

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9 July 1965

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MAHON BRIEFING

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9 July 1965

## DCI MAHON BRIEFING

SOUTH VIETNAM

I. The Viet Cong offensive has picked up steam in the past two weeks, particularly in the central highlands where we have long expected a major Communist thrust. (1)

A. In Kontum Province, where there has been substantial evidence of both a Viet Cong buildup and reinforcement by North Vietnamese army elements, the district town of Dak To was attacked and overrun on 7 July.

1. Poor weather prevented any government attempt to recover the town for more than 24 hours, but late yesterday two marine battalions retook Dak To with no opposition.
2. The situation in the province, however, remains crucial. Another district town, Tou Morong, to the northeast of Dak To,

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was lost to the Viet Cong on 25 June; the third district town in northern Kontum, Dak Sut, is virtually isolated and has been under repeated enemy pressure.

3. With the Communists strongly entrenched in the northern half of Kontum, the provincial capital of Kontum town, about 30 miles southwest of Dak To, is increasingly vulnerable.
  - a. A Communist mortar attack on the government's district headquarters at Kontum town yesterday was repulsed by heavy counterfire with 105-mm. artillery.
4. The two marine battalions which retook Dak To have been assigned to protect the province capital area and are likely to be withdrawn shortly back to Kontum town; this may again leave Dak To exposed.

- II. In addition to the previously confirmed battalion of the North Vietnamese 325th Division in Kontum, COMUSMACV has now confirmed the entire 101st Regiment of the 325th in Kontum.

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A. There has been considerable evidence 

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that this regiment has been playing a major role in the current Viet Cong drive in Kontum; moreover, a second defector from the 101st reported that the entire regiment launched the attack and seizure of Tou Morong district town.

II. While the presence of the bulk of the 325th in South Vietnam has not yet been confirmed, there is a growing body of evidence from prisoners and defectors that the 325th's two other regiments, the 95th and the 18th, are in Pleiku and Phu Bon Provinces, respectively.

A. Cumulative evidence also developed from

Viet Cong  points to a substantial build-up of Viet Cong forces in the Pleiku-Phu Bon area; this was substantiated by increased harassment of district towns, paramilitary camps and roads over the past several weeks.

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1. A major clash occurred in Phu Bon on 29-30 June between three government battalions and three Viet Cong battalions;

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the government troops fought their way out, killing 123 Viet Cong, but suffered fairly heavy losses of their own and did not accomplish their mission of evacuating a beleaguered district town.

III. At present, all major roads leading into the highlands from Saigon or the central coast are cut or closed, as a result of Viet Cong sabotage.

A. This sabotage activity is designed to accomplish one of the Viet Cong aims--the interdiction of land lines of communication north and east of Saigon in order to isolate towns from one another and force greater government reliance on air for rescue or resupply.

1. In the past two weeks, this interference with land travel has been accompanied by increasing harassment of airfields; at least nine have been mortared or raided since 23 June, but only two--the shelling of Nha Trang airfield

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and the sabotage raid on Da Nang air base--inflicted significant aircraft damage or casualties.

B. Another major aim of the Viet Cong is the piecemeal destruction of South Vietnamese units through classic tactics of attack on remote targets and the ambush of relief forces.

1. A new attack last weekend on the government outpost of Ba Gia west of Quang Ngai city--and the site of a major regimental Viet Cong attack in late May which resulted in the destruction of three government battalions--succeeded in temporarily overrunning the post and harassing it for 24 hours.
2. A battalion moving to relieve an outpost under attack in Binh Duong Province, just northeast of Saigon yesterday, however, was ambushed and almost totally annihilated.
  - a. This time, however, the government moved cautiously in committing forces to the rescue of Ba Gia; pressure on the post has now subsided, and

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it has been reinforced by two companies.

- C. Largely as a result of the fighting since May, US advisers now rate a total of 19 South Vietnamese battalions as combat ineffective.
- D. In this situation, it appears likely that there may soon be a need for US combat forces to back up South Vietnam's hard-pressed reserves.

IV. US military personnel in South Vietnam now totals 68,200, of whom 23,000 are in combat units.

- A. The US combat troops are already engaged in aggressive patrolling from their bases, and have conducted some major search-and-destroy operations in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces and the Australian battalion.

- 1. In the second such major operation, launched on 6 July in the Communist War Zone D stronghold, about 30-35 miles north of Saigon, elements of the US Airborne Brigade, the Australian

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2. US Marines today reoccupied an island near the new base at Chu Lai in central Vietnam after it had been briefly overrun by a Viet Cong force.

a. In fighting which apparently is still going on, the Marines thus far have killed at least 4 Communists and captured 51.

b. A US Navy destroyer is reported offshore so as to close off any avenue of escape for the apparently trapped Viet Cong.

battalion, and the South Vietnamese all encountered intensive combat before beginning their withdrawal yesterday.

a. US casualties so far are reported as seven killed and 38 wounded, with Australian casualties of three wounded; confirmed Viet Cong losses stand at 25 killed and four captured, with unconfirmed reports of over 100 killed as of yesterday. In addition, substantial quantities of rice were destroyed or captured, along with at least 18 weapons seized and various huts and other Viet Cong installations demolished.

B. Although we have no firm results from the two US B-52 raids of 5 and 7 July, also against the Zone D area,

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1,500 750-pound bombs were delivered.

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V. On the political side, in Saigon, the new military government continues to emphasize its themes of austerity and a crackdown on corruption, and has taken some steps to implement these policies, as well as its programs to improve the military manpower situation.

A. The government has largely backtracked on its initial crackdown order on the Saigon vernacular press, allowing all but 13 to reopen under pleas of hardship from local editors.

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1. This move, and Premier Ky's own efforts to reassure the Catholic community has softened the earlier hostility of the Catholics, but there are growing signs that the Buddhists are leaving the door open to future opposition.

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DCI MAHON BRIEFING

NORTH VIETNAM

I. The build-up of North Vietnam's defense is receiving continuing Soviet assistance.

A. So far, we have photographed five SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites forming a ring 10 to 15 miles out from Hanoi. There will probably be six there altogether.

A Soviet diplomat said recently that there were also SAM sites around Haiphong. We have not seen any there, but we haven't had good recent photography of the Haiphong area.

1. Three of the Hanoi sites are completed or practically completed, while photographs show unidentified equipment in some of the launch revetments in at least three sites. We have not yet photographed any actual missiles, but we believe it likely that these are in North Vietnam. Probably when all the

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sites have been completed, the equipment will be moved into them simultaneously, and the sites will become operational in short order.

2. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft have of course been within range of these SAM sites. Our bombings so far have been away from Hanoi, although in recent days we have been attacking military targets well north and west of the capital.

B. There are now 66 MIG jet fighters--the older MIG-15s and MIG-17s--in North Vietnam. Mainly they have stayed near Hanoi, approaching our attacking aircraft only in isolated instances.

1. There are also eight IL-28 jet light bombers at Hanoi.

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ILLEGIB

any particular type of aircraft. We suspect this is training activity involving Soviet instructors and North Vietnamese students.

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D. Our aircraft shot down three of the MIGs last month.

E. We have been hitting targets in northwest North Vietnam which include major barracks areas at Dien Bien Phu and Son La as well as ammunition dumps.

II. North Vietnam is still showing no interest in the subject of negotiating rather than fighting in Vietnam.

A. Both Hanoi and the Liberation Front have criticized the Commonwealth Peace Mission in harsh terms, reserving particular invective for Prime Minister Wilson.

III. Recent Chinese propaganda statements appear designed to give the impression that China has moved closer to direct military involvement in Vietnam.

A. Peiping has been putting out the word through a variety of channels that the Chinese do not want war with the US but they are prepared for it if necessary and will intervene directly as they did in Korea if the US bombs China or if a collapse of the DRV appears imminent.

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B. The authorities in South China appear to be deliberately fanning fears that China will become directly involved in the Vietnam war, apparently to stimulate greater compliance with civil defense and other related policies.

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2. One heavily publicized type of "preparation" is militia training, which apparently was further intensified in early June.

C. There have, however, been no major troop movements or other significant military developments which would be expected if Peiping were about to launch a Korean-type mass intervention.

D. We have good evidence that the Chinese have sent several railway engineering units to south China, probably to improve rail capability for handling shipments to North

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*Vietnam*  
*[redacted]*

Korea. There is considerable evidence that shipments are backlogged, and some of them have to be diverted to coastal shipping.

E. Recent but still tenuous information suggests that a Chinese Communist military unit may be located in northeastern North Vietnam.

*[redacted]* the unit is of division

level, but this cannot yet be supported by US analysis. The function of this unit has not been determined, although it appears to be a ground force element.

1. It is likely that this unit is associated with the build-up in logistical capabilities in the Sino-DRV border area.

There has been recent evidence of backlogging in supplies moving by rail to North Vietnam and it is possible that this unit could be involved in maintaining and improving the North Vietnamese rail line between Pinghsiang and Hanoi.

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F. Communist China is also building four new airfields along the southern border to handle the increased number of aircraft. In addition, photography of 1 July showed a new airfield under construction in central North Vietnam.

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9 July 1965

DCI MAHON BRIEFING

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- I. In the Dominican Republic, the OAS Committee appears to be close to implementing a political solution to the crisis. Moderates in the rebel camp, however, continue to object to aspects of the OAS proposals and will probably end up tacitly accepting but not supporting any new provisional government. Extremists are likely to continue their resistance no matter what settlement is reached.
- II. Moderate rebels still make counterproposals unacceptable to the loyalists. They probably will reluctantly accept the OAS's suggested provisional president, former diplomat Hector Garcia Godoy. Juan Bosch and his supporters are negotiating after realizing that they were not in full control of the rebel movement. They were convinced of this by events such as the unsuccessful general strike of late June which they did not support.

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A. The rebels have retracted some of their original demands but still insist that they be given some influence over the military and they may oppose stringent action against extremists.

1. On July 5 the rebels gave the OAS their draft institutional act aimed at guiding the provisional government. Ambassador Bunker found it to be a revision of Bosch's 1963 constitution that would give the rebels a substantial political victory and as such completely unacceptable.

B. The rebel government's position is being actively supported by the orthodox Communist party, the PSPD. The PSPD, however, appears to be encouraging Caamano's advisers to oppose Garcia, probably feeling that any US-supported president would crack down on them.

C. The Chinese-oriented Dominican Popular Movement and much of the pro-Castro Fourteenth of June Political Group are opposing negotiations and appear to be making preparations

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for terrorism and guerrilla warfare after a political settlement.

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D. The extremists have made several attempts to provoke uprisings in the interior. On June 25 they attacked loyalist forces in the interior city of San Francisco de Macoris but were repulsed. Two other attacks were made on police posts since then.

III. The Imbert regime, despite its earlier intransigence, will probably accept a political settlement under US and OAS pressure.

A. Imbert originally demanded that his regime be the provisional government. The loyalist military leaders have undercut him, however, and said they would withdraw their support when an acceptable provisional government was found. They have already endorsed Garcia Godoy. Imbert recently said he would step down when he was assured that Communism or a "new despotism" would not follow him.

IV. The country as a whole has welcomed the OAS proposals after nearly two and a half months of civil war.

A. A group of professionals and businessmen have come forward to serve in a provisional

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[redacted]

government, and is backing Garcia Godoy  
for the provisional presidency.

B. Supporters of ex-President Joaquin Balaguer,  
who returned to the country on 28 June,  
are enthusiastic over the OAS proposal,  
feeling that their man is sure to win in  
free elections.

V. Latin Americans in the Inter-American Peace  
Force (IAPF) now number 1,800 with the addition  
of a Paraguayan company.

A. US forces, the major IAPF contingent, num-  
ber about 11,500 troops. Two battalions  
of the 82nd Airborne are being withdrawn.  
US casualties now are 25 dead and 155  
wounded.

[redacted]

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DCI MAHON BRIEFING

COLOMBIA

- I. The Colombian National Front Government's continued inability to correct critical financial and economic problems is reviving public demand for President Valencia's resignation, and could eventually lead to the replacement of the National Front system, even by a military junta.
  - A. Business and labor are restive; prices have edged up; and the critical foreign exchange problem is still unsolved.
- II. A sudden worsening of the country's foreign exchange position triggered the current crisis.
  - A. Finance Minister Duran resigned in protest over President Valencia's refusal to institute reforms--equivalent to devaluation of the peso.
  - B. Dissension also broke up a "High Commission" President Valencia planned to send to Washington for financial discussions.

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C. Ignacio Copete Lizarralde may take a leave of absence from his International Development Bank post to become Finance Minister, but only if his request for a "free hand" is fulfilled.

III. Congress, called into special session in April to consider economic measures aimed at improving the government's bad fiscal position, has thus far done nothing.

IV. Public confidence, particularly among the wealthier citizens, has been shaken by instances of outlawry in the country.

A. The government's ability to maintain order is nevertheless good and has been strengthened by the President's declaration of a state of siege following student disorders in May.

B. Violence in the interior does not appear to be on the increase. Both the press and government sources have recently announced some successes against bandits and Communist guerrilla groups.

1. Army troops and civic action units have been penetrating the so-called "Communist

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enclaves" in the rugged slopes of the Andes in the Southern Magdalena valley.

2. They have had less success, however, in coming to grips with the Castro-financed, Cuban-trained ELN or Army of National Liberation. The ELN, operating with about 50 men north of Bogota in Santander Province, raided the village of Simacota in January to obtain police weapons and uniforms and several banks in other communities.

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## DCI MAHON BRIEFING

PERU

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1. In Peru, successful guerrilla attacks carried out by the pro-Cuban and pro-Peiping MIR, or Movement of the Revolutionary Left, in the central highlands have prompted the government to increase its counterinsurgency efforts.
  - A. On July 4th, constitutional guarantees were suspended, and a police roundup of leftist extremists began in Lima where two terrorist bombings occurred.
  - B. Command of counterinsurgency operations against the guerrillas, previously in the hands of the police, has been assumed by the army. No army units are in action as yet, but 100 rangers have been sent to the area for eventual commitment against the insurgents.
- II. Guerrilla activity began in the central zone on June 9, when a group of about 13 armed men attacked two ranches, a mine, and a police post. They stole weapons and dynamite. Other ranches

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were subsequently raided. The most serious incident took place on June 27, when a 28-man police patrol was ambushed; guerrillas killed seven policemen and wounded nine.

A. A disturbing factor is that the guerrillas have had considerable success in cultivating the sympathy and collaboration of the peasants in the area, while the security forces have done nothing but alienate them.

III. The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150 of whom have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea. Another group of foreign trainees reportedly will return to Peru by early July. The MIR has been preparing for guerrilla warfare now for two years.

A. Twenty-three foreign-trained guerrillas, plus several hundred partly trained collaborators from nearby villages, are located at three camps near the general location of the June attacks.

B. MIR also has a guerrilla camp near Cuzco in Southern Peru, and three in the northern part of the country. Guerrillas in the southern camp, who are even better prepared and have more peasant support than those in the central zone, reportedly will begin small-scale attacks there sometime in July.

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DCI MAHON BRIEFING

ECUADOR

I. The ruling military junta is seeking to neutralize the nationwide antiregime demonstrations scheduled for today by implying concessions, by offering to renew conversations with the political opposition, and by increasing police vigilance.

A. The demonstrations may be punctuated by acts of violence--particularly in Guayaquil and Quito. It has become common knowledge that the junta has ordered the police not to provide the demonstrators with "martyrs" by firing upon them.

B. The armed forces have thus far supported the junta, but there are reports which cast doubt on the loyalty of some military units or their obedience to orders.

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9 July 1965

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## DCI MAHON BRIEFING

CONGO

I. The Congo is quieting down fitfully, but large areas in the northeast are still plagued by roving rebel bands, and there is some new rebel resurgence in the eastern Congo, along Lake Tanganyika. The government mop-up of rebels will be a slow and arduous task, and we can expect new outbursts in the future.

A. Tanzania continues to give the rebels sanctuary, training, and material aid, and it is the area along Lake Tanganyika which concerns us most.

1. Recently government forces killed four men who had been accompanying rebel forces north of Albertville. At least two of the four men have been identified as Cubans. About 40 Cubans arrived in Tanzania in mid-May, and some of these have been reported at Congolese rebel training camps in Tanzania in the eastern Congo.

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2. Plans are underway for a strong offensive to clean out this area.

B. Most rebel leaders remain outside the Congo soliciting aid for their cause. They continue to squabble among themselves, and there seems to be little coordination between the factions and with the rebel bands within the Congo.

C. The increasing disintegration of the rebellion, however, is due mostly to the effectiveness of the white mercenaries and to the use of aircraft. The Congo Army is no better than it ever was, and the mercenaries and aircraft will be required for some time yet.

II. Politically, the Congo seems to be getting on its feet, although the political struggle between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombé seems to be heating up.

A. National elections have been held, and Tshombé and his allies have emerged as the clear winners. He won more than 100 of the 166 lower house seats, and controls at least 13 of the Congo's 21 provincial governments.

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B. The new parliament was to meet on June 30th, but the Court of Appeals has ruled that new elections must be held in three provinces.

C. There is some evidence that this ruling is a move in the political infighting which has been in progress for several months between President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombé over the presidency.

1. Kasavubu has indicated he wants to retain the office--which under the constitution is the locus of power--and Tshombé is clearly attracted by power. Presidential elections are to be held six months after parliament meets.
2. The Tshombé and Kasavubu factions may have moved a step closer to a showdown following the President's summary dismission on 7 July of Minister of Interior and Governor-Elect of East Katanga, Godefroid Munongo.
3. Supporters in each camp are trying to force a showdown, and Kasavubu's supporters now are trying to inveigle ex-Premier Adoula to return to join the quarrel.

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4. Embassy officials have sought to impress on both Kasavubu and Tshombé that we want them to stick together, but whether they will is uncertain at this time. The positions of the Kasavubu and Tshombé factions seem to be hardening and we may be reaching a point where either man may try to force the other out.

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9 July 1965

## DCI MAHON BRIEFING

MIDDLE EASTIRAQ

I. In the Iraqi Government, the long-standing struggle between pro- and anti-Egyptians has come to a head. Provoked by President Arif, some ten pro-Egyptian ministers as well as other important figures in the regime have resigned en masse.

A. Arif is having great difficulty in finding replacements for these men, since most Iraqis feel that the regime, even without the Nasirists, will not survive for long. In the end Arif may be forced to compromise with the Nasirists to keep his administration going. The continuing impasse has led to renewed and unsubstantiated rumors of coups that would sweep aside the regime entirely.

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YEMEN

## II. The political situation in Yemen is chaotic.

- A. Last week Prime Minister Numan announced his resignation as a result of President Sallal's attempt to create a supreme armed forces council without consulting Numan's cabinet. Numan flew to Cairo to obtain Nasir's backing against Sallal.
- B. Sallal, after an attempt on his life last Sunday, took advantage of the absence in Cairo of nearly all major political leaders to order widespread arrests. At least three cabinet ministers are included in the more than 60 individuals rounded up to date. Sallal has apparently appointed himself prime minister and has flown to Cairo to confer with Nasir.
- C. Cairo apparently knew of Sallal's intended purge, and although any overt assistance to Sallal has been forbidden, this "hands off" policy in effect provides support for Sallal's move. Nasir's backing of Sallal probably stems from his distrust of several ministers in Numan's cabinet whom he suspects

of being members of the Baath party,  
Nasir's principal ideological rival in  
the Arab world.

ISRAEL-LEBANON  
(JORDAN RIVER)

8

III. The Israelis, having successfully intimidated Syria from making any meaningful progress on Jordan River headwaters diversion, now claim Lebanon is making significant progress on its part of the project.

A. The Israelis imply that they may also have to stop the Lebanese by military means. Tel Aviv is urging the US, Britain, and France to deter Beirut from further activity.

B. We believe Israel will continue to exert pressure on Lebanon through indirect diplomatic channels before taking any military action.

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D. The Syrians, meanwhile, may be quietly resuming construction activity on their territory at a new site. If and when the Israelis learn of it, we may have another spoiling operation on that front.

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DCI MAHON BRIEFING

CYPRUS

I. Negotiations between Athens and Ankara for a Cyprus solution are stalled over Turkey's demand for territorial compensation in exchange for agreeing to union of Cyprus with Greece.

A. The Turks, whose ethnics amount to 18 percent of the island's population, want the equivalent of 18 percent of the island's area--about 700 square miles, either on Cyprus or in Thrace.

B. Greek Cypriot leaders are very suspicious of the Greek-Turkish dialogue and oppose any concessions by Cyprus to achieve union.

C. Greek Premier Papandreou, facing increasingly serious domestic political problems, is examining the possibility of offering small territorial compensation to Turkey from the Thrace area along the Greek-Turkish border.

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1. The Greeks have also discussed with London the possibility that the British might share with Turkey the control of one of the two British military bases on Cyprus. London is replying cautiously, but has indicated that acceptance probably would be forthcoming if this were the only way to reach a final settlement.
- II. Reports from Nicosia indicate the Greek Cypriots are proceeding with plans to install Soviet-built surface-to-air missile sites on the island.
  - A. One missile launching pad is reported under construction and nearing completion near the capital city of Nicosia.
  - B. Soviet-built missile-associated equipment has been arriving from the UAR since last winter but there is no confirmation that SA-2 missiles themselves are present.



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C. While the SA-2s would be of limited military significance in case of Turkish intervention, their actual installation will further irritate Turkish leaders and could be part of an effort by Makarios to sabotage the current Greek-Turkish dialogue.

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9 July 1965

## DCI MAHON BRIEFING

STATUS OF SOVIET BOMBER DEVELOPMENT

I. The appearance of the big AN-22 Soviet transport aircraft and the model of a proposed Soviet supersonic transport at the Paris Air Show appears to have given new life to the perennial speculation on whether the Soviet Union is or is not working to develop a follow-on heavy bomber.

A. First of all, I want to assure you that we are not going to withhold or dismiss or downgrade any evidence pointing in this direction simply because the majority view in our estimate is that the Soviets are not now engaged in developmental work on a heavy bomber. We think it is unlikely, but we do not feel it is impossible, and so we naturally maintain a close watch for any indication of such a development, especially since this is a debated issue in the intelligence community.

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B. To review the evidence we have, and which we have cranked into our reports and our existing estimates. There has been some R&D work on a successor to the aging BEARS and BISONS of Long Range Aviation.

1. We saw the first signs of work which could have been meant to lead to a new supersonic heavy late in 1958, when a large Delta-wing aircraft was spotted at the Fili airframe plant near Moscow.

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3. In the summer of 1961 the Soviets flew a modified version of this aircraft,  in an air show. This aircraft had improved engines, and was estimated to have a top speed of about Mach 1.4. Its configuration clearly suggested that it was initially designed as a bomber.

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C. At this point, the Soviets apparently lost interest in the [redacted] program. The first two aircraft have never reappeared, and to our knowledge [redacted] has never flown. It continues to sit on jacks at Fili with no signs that it is being worked on. We think development probably stopped when the [redacted] designer, Myasishchev, was transferred to a new job in 1960 or 1961.

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1. It is probably not coincidental that R&D on a supersonic manned bomber stopped at just about the time the Soviet ICBM program was getting into high gear. By this time the SS-7 and SS-8, second-generation ICBMs, were in their flight test programs.

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II. There is one more recent bit of evidence possibly bearing on heavy bombers. US and British air attachés have seen an unknown aircraft at Ramenskoye airfield near Moscow, on a trip between June 10 and June 16.

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A. They described the aircraft as having a long, very slender fuselage, and a Delta wing similar to the [redacted] but smaller. It also had pods at the wingtips which they thought might be engines, one of the features of the [redacted] 25X1  
The tailfin was described as tall, narrow, and raked.

B. From what is known, this would appear to be a new large fighter. [redacted] the 25X1  
Soviets are testing several new types of fighters at Ramenskoye.

C. We are looking into the possibility, however, that the new aircraft could be a follow-on bomber design. The original report is silent on many of the details needed to evaluate the aircraft, and we have asked the attachés for any additional details they can provide. We have also asked NPIC to scan recent coverage of Ramenskoye in an attempt to correlate the attaché report with some aircraft visible in overhead photography.

D. Incidentally, in connection with those wingtip

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pods, [redacted]

[redacted] that Soviet design

theory for a Mach 3.5 to Mach 4 aircraft is working along the lines of turbojets for original acceleration, and ram-jets located near the wingtips for high-speed cruising.

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III. The initial stages of a heavy bomber development program, under tight security wraps, might escape our notice, but we would expect satellite reconnaissance to detect a new prototype soon after it is rolled out.

A. There are only 10 Soviet airframe plants with final assembly areas large enough for heavy bomber production. We cover them at intervals with satellite photography.

B. Two of them, both at Moscow, are unlikely candidates because their runways are too short for supersonic heavy bombers. The other eight are known to be producing other aircraft at present.

C.

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D

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E. It has been suggested that a highly publicized program for development of a Super-Sonic Transport-- like the TU-144 shown in scale model at the Paris Air Show--might be used to conceal the development of a supersonic bomber in early stages, including flight tests. Our technical analysts should be able to determine the military potential of such an aircraft fairly early in the game, and conversion from an SST to a military bomber is by no means simple.

1. Complex subsystems, including advanced electronics or possibly compatible stand-off missiles, would have to be added, and we would expect a tip-off from the testing of these systems.

IV. In sum, we are quite certain that there is no flying prototype of a new Soviet heavy bomber at this time. If such an aircraft is in the early stages of development, we feel confident that our intelligence resources will reveal its existence early in the two-to-five year period

between the initial flight testing and the final operational deployment. I want to assure you again that when and if we obtain any such evidence, you will be informed.

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